Solution Manual for Public Finance, 10th Edition
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Part 1 – Getting Started 1 - 1 Instructor’s Manual to accompany Public Finance, Tenth Edition, by Harvey S. Rosen and Ted Gayer Chapter 1 – Introduction Brief Outline 1. Public Finance and Ideology a. The Organic View of Government b. The Mechanistic View of Government c. The V iewpoint of T his B ook 2. Government at a G lance a. Legal Framework i. Federal Government ii. State and L ocal G overnments b. Size of Government c. Expenditures d. Revenues e. Our Agenda Suggested Answers to End - of - Chapter Discussion Questions 1. a. McCain ’s statement is consistent with an organic conception of government. Individuals and their goals are less important than the state. b. Locke makes a clear statement of th e mechanistic view of the state in which individual liberty is of paramount importance. c. Chavez’s statement is consistent with an organic view of government. The individual has significance only as part of society as a whole. 2. Libertarians believe in a very limited government and are skeptical about the ability of government to improve social welfare. Social democrats believe that substantial government intervention is required for the good of individuals. Someone with an organic conception of the state believes that the goals of society are set by the state and individuals are valued only by their contribution to the realization of social goals. a. A law prohibiting receiving compensation for organ donation would be opposed by libertarians, as they would want the market to decide who buys and who sells organs and at what price the organs would be sold. Social democrats also might oppose the law if they consider that such a law would prevent organ donati on from happening as frequently. However, they are likely to support the law on the grounds that paying for organ donation would coerce financially desperate people to sell their organs. The law woul d protect the individual from making a poor
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 1 - 2 decision. The organic view might also oppose the law because the society might become healthier if more individuals received transplants, although they would believe that individuals should donate for the good of society, rather than for compensation . b. Libertarians oppose the law mandating helmet use for motorcyclists , arguing that individuals can best decide whether or not to use helmets without government coercion. Social democrats take the position that the mandate saves lives and ultimately benefits individuals. The organic view would probably lead to favoring the mandate on the grounds that reduced health care costs caused by fewer injuries benefit society. c. Libertarians oppose the law mandating child safety seats, arguing that individuals can best decide whether or not to use child safety seats without government coercion. Social democrats take the position that the mandate saves lives and ultimately benefits individuals. The organic view would probably lead to favoring the mandate on the grounds that reduced health care costs caused by fewer accidents benefit society. d. Libertarians would probably oppose a law prohibiting prostitution, while social democrats would likely favor such a law. The organic view depends on the type of society policymakers are attempting to achieve. The law would probably be favored on moral grounds. e. Libertarians would probably oppose a law prohibiting polygamy, while social democrats would likely favor such a law. The organic view depends on the type of society policymakers are attempting to achieve. The law would probably be favored on moral grounds. f. Libertarians would likely oppose the ban on trans fats in restaurants , believing that consumers will demand restaurants remove trans fats if they believe that is important . Social democrats would probably support the ban because consumers might not understand how bad trans fats are for their health . Those with an organic view would probably favor the ban because the scientific literature suggests that people who avoid trans fats are healthier, therefore the ban would reduce health care costs . 3. The mechanistic view of government says that the government is a contrivance created by individuals to better achieve their individual goals. Within the mechanistic tradition, people could disagree on the tax on saturated fats to reduce obesity . Libertarians would say that people can decide what is best for themselves - whether to consume saturated fats - and do not need prodding from the government. In contrast, social democrats might argue that people are too short sighted to know what is good for them, so that government - provided inducements are appropriate.
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Part 1 – Getting Started 1 - 3 4. a. If the size of government is measured by direct expenditures, the mandate does not directly increase it. Costs of compliance, however, may be high and would appear as an increase in a “regulatory budget. ” b. This ban would not increase government expenditures, but the high costs of compliance would increase the regulatory budget. c. It’s hard to say whether this represents an increase or decrease in the size of government. One possibility is that GDP stayed the same, and government purchases of goods and services fell. Another is that government purchases of goods and services grew, but at a slower rate than the GDP. One must also consider coincident federal credit and regulatory activities and state and local budgets. d. The federal budget would decrease if grants - in - aid were reduced. However, if state and local governments offset this by increasing taxes, the size of the government sector as a whole would not go down as much as one would have guessed. 5. The inflation erodes the real value of the debt by 0.0 36 x £ 904 billion or £ 32 .54 billion. The fact that inflation reduces the real debt obligation means that this figure should be included as revenue to the government. 6. If you consider the size of government as the extent to which society’s resources are subject to control by the government, the both Policy 1 and Policy 2 would increase the size of government by the same amount. While it seems Policy 1 has no effect of the size of the government because it only mandates private spending, it causes resources to be under the control of the government. Policy 2 seems to affect the size of the government because it changes revenues and transfers, but the cost to each household is the same as in Policy 1, a $5000 expenditure on health insurance or in additional taxes. 7. Relative to GDP, defense spending grew from 5.0 percent of GDP in 1981 to 6.0 percent of GDP in 1985 and then grew from 3 .9 percent of GDP i n 200 7 to 4.7 percent of GDP in 200 11 . The increase from 200 7 to 2011 was proportionally larger , but both increases were the same in terms of the percentage point increase. 8. a. For the years 1997 to 2001 , the absolute change in federal expenditures was $ 261.7 billion [ $1862.8 - $1,601.2 billion ] , the change in federal expenditures in real terms ( 2001 dollars) was $ 146.26 billion [ inflation rate = ( 90.727 - 84.628)/84.628 =7. 21 %, $1, 862 billion – $ 1, 601 (1+0.07 21 )=$ 146.26 billion] , the change in real government expenditures per capita was $ 241.26 [ real government expenditures per capita in 1997 ( 2001 dollars): $ 1,601.1 *(1+1.07 21 )/0.2 27912 = $ 6,289.72 ; real government expenditures per
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 1 - 4 capita in 2001 ( 2001 dollars): $ 1862.8 /0. 2 85225 billion = $ 6,530.98 ; $6,530.98 - $6,289.72=$241.26 ], and the change in expenditures per GDP is - $0.01 1 06 billion [$ 601.1 /$ 8,332.4 – $1, 862.8 /$ 10,286.2 ] . For the years 20 07 to 20 11 , the absolute change in federal expenditures was $ 874.4 billion [$ 3,603.1 billion - $ 2,728.7 billion] , the change in federal expenditures in real terms (20 11 dollars) was $ 691.9 billion [inflation rate = (113. 338 - 106.231 )/ 106.231 = 6.69 %, $ 3,603.1 billion – $ 2728.7 (1+0.10 669 ) = $ 691.9 billion] , the change in real government expenditures per capita was $ 1,899.78 [real government expenditures per capita in 20 07 ( 20 11 dollars): $ 2,728 *(1+1. 10 669 )/0. 3017 = $ 9,647.14 ; real government expenditures per capita in 20 11 ( 20 11 dollars): [ $ 3,603 /0. 3120 billion = $ 11 , 546.92 ; $11,546.92$9,647.14=$1,899.78 ], and the change in expenditures per GDP is - $0.0 442 billion [ $ 2,728.7 /$ 14,028 – $ 3,603. 1 /$ 15,094 ] . b. The health spending and “other” categories had the largest relative increases changes from 1997 to 2001 and 2007 to 2011. Net interest had the only decrease in spending. 1997 2001 relative change from 1997 to 2001 2007 2011 relative change from 2007 to 2011 Defense 285.7 321.2 12.426% 579.8 751.3 29.579% Health 123.8 172.2 39.095% 266.4 372.5 39.827% Medicare 190.0 217.4 14.421% 375.4 485.7 29.382% Income secruity 235.0 269.8 14.809% 366.0 597.4 63.224% Social Security 365.3 433.0 18.533% 586.2 730.8 24.667% Net Interest 244.0 206.2 - 15.492% 237.1 230.0 - 2.995% Other 157.3 243.1 54.545% 317.9 435.5 36.993% 9. a. The 1997 to 2001 absolute change in federal tax revenues was $4 11.9 billion (= $1991.1 - $1579.5) , while from 200 7 to 20 11 the same change was - $ 264.5 billion (=$2 30 3. 5 - $2568.0 ) . In real terms, the 1997 to 2001 change in federal tax revenues was $ 298.04 (inflation over period 7. 21 %, real change =$ 1991.1 - ($1579.2*1.0721 ) . For 2007
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Part 1 – Getting Started 1 - 5 to 2011 , the change in federal tax revenues was $ - 43 6 . 30 (inflation over period 6.69 %, real change = $ 2303.5 - $ 2568.0 *1. 0669 ) . The change in real tax revenues per capita for 1997 to 2001 was $ 778.16 (=($ 1991.1 /.2 8522 5 - $ 1579.2 *(1.07 21 )/0.2729 58 )) and for 2007 to 2011 was $ - 1699.26 (=($ 2303.5 /. 312040 - $ 2568.0 *(1. 0669 )/0. 301696 )) . The change in the tax revenues per GDP from 1997 to 2001 was 0. 004 (= $1991.1/10286.2 - $1579.5/83 32.4 ) and from 2007 to 2011 was 0.0530 ($2303.5/15094 - $2568.0/14028 ) . b. From 1997 to 2001, social insurance taxes had the largest relative increase. From 2007 to 2011, the excise tax had the largest relative increase. From 1997 to 2001 and 2007 to 2011 , social corporate taxes revenue had the largest relative decrease. 1997 2001 relative change from 1997 to 2001 2007 2011 relative change from 2007 to 2011 Individual Income Tax 737.5 994.3 34.820% 1163.5 1091.5 - 6.188% Corporate Tax 182.3 151.1 - 17.115% 370.2 181.1 - 51.080% Social Insurance 539.4 694.0 28.661% 869.6 818.8 - 5.842% Excise Tax 120.1 151.7 26.311% 164.7 212.1 28.780%
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Part 1 - Getting Started 2 - 1 Chapter 2 – Tools of Positive Analysis Brief Outline 1. The Role of Theory 2. Causation versus Correlation 3. Experimental Studies a. Conducting an Experimental Study b. Pitfalls of Experimental Studies 4. Observational Studies a. Conducting an Observational Study b. Pitfalls of Observational Studies 5. Quasi - Experimental Studies a. Conducting a Quasi - Experimental Study b. Pitfalls of Quasi - Experimental Studies 6. Conclusions Answers to End - of - Chapter Questions 1. A change in the marginal tax rate changes the individual’s net wage. This generates both an income effect and a substitution effect. As long as leisure is a normal good, these effects work in opposite directions. Hence, one cannot tell a priori whether labor supply increases or decreases. If there were no political or legal impediments, an experimental study could be conducted in which a control group confront s the status quo, and an experimental group face s the new tax regime. Other things that affect work effort would impact both the control group and the experimental group, so any difference in work effort between the two groups could be attributed to the change in marginal tax rates. 2. This is a valid criticism of the study of New York Homelessness . It reflects the problem of causality. Two things may be correlated, but it can be difficult to determine which causes the other. T he remedy would be to set up a study in which individuals are randomly assigned to groups. In an experimental study, the group offered job training, counseling services, and emergency money would not necessarily be more motivated than a group not signed up for those services , so if they do not become homeless , it could be attributed to the programs . 3. The workers who spend time on a computer probably have other skills and abilities that contribute to higher wages, so training children to use computers would not necessarily cause their earnings potential to improve. This study illustrates the difficulty of determining cause and effect based on correlations. The data do not reveal whether using a computer causes higher earnings, or whether other factors cause workers to use computers and to earn higher wages. 4. The text points out the pitfalls of social experiments: the problem of obtaining a random sample and the problems of extending results beyond the scope of the experiment. Participants in the study had found it to their advantage to be a part of the experiment, which may have resulted in a self - selected population unrepresentative of the wider group of health care consumers. In addition, the RAND Health Insurance Experiment was of limited duration, after which the participants would move to some other hea lth plan. This
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Chapter 2 - Tools of Positive Analysis 2 - 2 design could induce certain behavior in the short - run that would not necessarily be present if the health insurance coverage were permanent rather than transitory. Further, physicians’ “standard practices” are largely determined by the circumstances of the population as a whole, not the relatively small experimental group. 5. The scenario set up by the change in unemployment lends itself to a difference in difference approach, in which the first difference is across time and the second difference is across income level. The researcher would measure the change in unemployment duration for high earners between the period of lower benefits and the period of higher benefits, and then compare this change to the change for the low earners. The treatment group would be the high earners and the control group would be the low earners. The assumption that must hold for unbiased estimates is that in the absence of the policy change, both the treatment and control groups would have experienced the same change in unemployment duration across the periods preceding and following the policy change. 6. Since only five states reduced income taxes, we could examine what happened in a control group of states (those with an income tax but with no change in the tax rates) and compare savings rates between the two. This is important because other factors affect savings rates, but if other factors affected both the control group and the treatment group, then we can conclude that the treatment (lower taxes) caused the change in savings. If, for example, the saving rate for the five states with lower taxes (the treatment group) increased by two percent, while the savings rate for the other states (the control group) increased by one percent, then we could conclude that lower taxes caused the saving rate to increase by one percent — the difference between the two percent increase in the treatment group and the one percent increase in the control group. The assumption that must hold for this difference in difference approach to be valid is that in the absence of the income tax cut, the savings rates of the treatment rates would have increased by the same percentage as the savings rates of the control states. 7. Correlation does not, in general, reveal anything about causation. Spitzer is assuming that because there is no correlation between higher marginal tax rates and slowing economic activity in the data, that marginal tax rates can be raised without harming economic growth . The assumption ignores that other factors could be playing in the economy that would mitigate the effect of higher marginal tax rates . Further, current higher marginal tax rates could imply lower future economic growth, which may not be reflected in the data to which he was referring. 8. There is a weak, positive relationship between deficits and interest rates , implying that larger deficits lead to lower interest rates. Inferences base d on these data along would be problematic because there are only a few data point s and because it would be more informative to look at deficits relative to some benchmark, such as GDP , and to express both interest rates and deficits in real terms, rather than nominal terms. It would also be useful to control for other factors that can affect interest rates, such as monetary policy and the level of economic activity. Most importantly, the correlation found here does not necessarily indicate a causal relationship.
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Part 1 - Getting Started 3 - 1 Chapter 3 – Tools of Normative Analysis Brief Outline 1. Welfare Economics a. Pure Economy Exchange b. Production Economy 2. The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics 3. Fairness and the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics 4. Market Failure a. Market Power b. Nonexistence of Markets c. Overview 5. Buying into Welfare Economics Answers to End - of - Chapter Questions 1. a. I n this particular insurance market, one would not expect asymmetric information to be much of a problem – the probability of a hurricane is common knowledge. Moral hazard could be an issue – people are more likely to build near a beach if they have hurricane insurance. Still, one would expect the market for hurricane insurance to operate fairly efficiently. b. There is substantial asymmetric information in the markets for medical insurance for consumers and also malpractice insurance for physicians. For efficient consumption, the price must be equal to the marginal cost, and the effect of insurance may be to reduce the perceived price of medical care consumption. That would lead to consumption above the efficient level. Because of the roles of regulation, insurance, taxes, and the shifting of costs from the uninsured to the insured, there is little reason to expect the market to be efficient. c. In the stock market, there is good information and thousands of buyers and sellers. We expect, in general, efficient outcomes. d. From a national standpoint, there is a good deal of competition and information with regards to MP3 players and music . The outcome will likely be efficient for MP3 players and music . However, some firms might e xercise some market power through high brand awareness and proprietary downloading systems. e. The private market allocation is likely inefficient without government intervention. Student loan markets may suffer from asymmetric information – the student knows better than the lender whether he will repay the loan or default on it, a form of adverse selection. Government intervention does not “solve” the adverse selection problem in this case (because participation in the student loan program is not compulsory), but it may create a market that would not exist without intervention.
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Chapter 3 - Tools of Normative Analysis 3 - 2 f. The market for housing is likely to be relatively efficient. Some inefficiencies may exist, such as asymmetric information — the seller knows more about the house than the buyer — and differentiated products. But, the market has developed to mitigate these inefficiencies. For example, a buyer can employ a home inspector to help him understand more about the quality of the home. Also, a large number of homes on the market increases competition. 2. The social welfare function of W=f(U a , U b ) implies that the welfare of society depends on the utility of the individuals. It does not imply that the utility of the individua l depends on the welfare of society as then - Senator Obama’s comment suggests. 3. The First Theorem of Welfare Economics says that market transactions only occur when the transactions would be in the best interest of both parties. In contrast, the psychologist seems to view the kidney market as hurting one or both parties involved. 4. If insurers in California could no longer use location to determine automobile insurance rates, some of the higher costs incurred by urban residents would be shifted to rural and suburban residents. This change would reduce efficiency, but the purpose of the policy is to improve equity, based on an argument that it is unfair that urban residents should have to pay more for insurance because they are more likely to be involved in accidents. Social welfare increases if the additional utility enjoyed by urban residents offsets the loss in utility to rural and suburban residents. 5. a. Point A is the initial allocation. b. Given the initial allocation in the Edgeworth Box above , one can see that both the seller and buyer can reach a higher indifference curve at point B by trading tickets Other goods Other goods Tickets Tickets Buyer Seller A B
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Part 1 - Getting Started 3 - 3 and other goods without either person being worse off . T herefore, the current allocation is inefficient. c. A situation in which the original allocation is efficient and the trading does not affect efficiency is shown below at point A. 6. a. Social indifference curves are straight lines with slope of – 1. As far as society is concerned, the “util” to Augustus is equivalent to the “util” to Livia. Other goods Other goods Tickets Tickets Buyer Seller A
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Chapter 3 - Tools of Normative Analysis 3 - 4 b. Social indifference curves are straight lines with slope of – 2. This reflects the fact that society values a “util” to Augustus twice as much as a “util” to Livia. c.
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Part 1 - Getting Started 3 - 5 7. Musgrave (1959) developed the concept of merit goods to describe commodities that ought to be provided even if the members of society do not demand them . “Sin taxes” work the opposite way and apply to commodities that members of society might demand, but ought not to have. 8. a. There is no obvious reason why there is a market failure with burglar alarm calls; the Los Angeles police could set a response fee equal to the marginal cost. b. There is no obvious reason that the production of a documentary film about rock music and the fall of the Soviet Union would improve welfare in the United States . c. There is no economic reason why cherry pies should be regulated, especially since there are no such regulations for apple, blueberry, or peach frozen pies. d. It is hard to imagine a basis in welfare eco nomics for this guarantee to the domestic sugar producers , unless the utilities of sugar producers are given great weight in the social welfare function . e. This is not an efficient policy. If the problem is that too much water is being consumed, then the answer is to increase the price of water. On that basis, people can decide whether or not they want to buy toilets that require less water. Water, like most other resources, is a private good. f. There is no obvious reason that the preservation of video game history would improve welfare . 9. In this case, the “Edgeworth B ox” is actually a line because there is only one good on the island. The set of possible allocations is a straight line, 100 units long. Every allocation is Pareto efficient, because the only way to make one person better off is to make another person worse off. There is no theory in the text to help us decide whether an allocation is fair. Although splitting the peanuts even between the people may be fair, it may not be fair if the calorie “needs” of the people are different. With a social welfare function, we can make assessments on whether redistribution for society as a whole is a good thing. 10. Social welfare is maximized when Mark’s marginal utility of income is equal to Judy’s marginal utility of income. Taking the derivative of Mark’s utility function to find his marginal utility function yields MU M = 50/(I M 1/2 ) and taking the derivative of Judy’s utility function yields MU J = 100/(I J 1/2 ). If we set MU M equal to MU J , the condition for maximization becomes I J = 4I M and, since the fixed amount of income is $300, this means that Mark should have $60 and Judy should have $240 if the goal is to maximize social welfare = U M + U J .
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Chapter 3 - Tools of Normative Analysis 3 - 6 11. a. If the food is evenly distributed between Tang and Wilson, Tang will have 14.14 units of utility and Wilson will have 7.07 units of utility. b. If the social welfare function is U T +U W , then the marginal utilities of both should be equal to maximize social welfare. Equate MU T =1/( 2F T 1 /2 ) to MU W =1/( 4 F W 1 /2 ) and substitute F T =400 - F W . Therefore, F T =320 and F W =80. c. If the utility of both Tang and Wilson must be equal, then set U T =U W and substitute F T =400 - F W and solve. Therefore, F T =80 and F W =320. 12. Although Victoria’s marginal rate of substitution is equal to Albert’s, these are not equal to the marginal rate of transformation and the allocation is, therefore, Pareto inefficient. Both people would give up 2 cups of tea for 1 crumpet but, according to the production function, could actually get 6 crumpets by giving up 2 cups of tea. By giving up tea and getting crumpets through the production function, both utilities are raised. 13. a. The marginal rates of substitution for coffee and for tea are constant for both Hannah and Jose. Hannah would trade ¼ pound of coffee for 1/3 pound of tea to remain equally satisfied. Similarly, Jose would trade ¼ pound of tea for 1/3 pound of coffee to remain equally satisfied. The constant MRS means linear indifference curves b. Green indifference curves are Jose’s and red i ndifference curves are Hannah’s. Coffee Tea Tea Hannah Jose Coffee 15 1 3 1 1 1 0
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Part 1 - Getting Started 3 - 7 c. The contract curve follows the bottom and right borders of the Edgeworth Box. At any interior point in the box, the parties will find it in their interest to trade until they reach these borders. This is because Hannah would only choose to consume tea once she has consumed all the coffee in the economy. Likewise, Jose would only choose to consume coffee once he has consumed all the tea in the economy. d. The initial allocation is not Pareto efficient. It is possible to make one better off without making the other worse off. 14. a. False. As shown in the text, equality of the marginal rates of substitution is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. T he MRS for each individual must also equal the MRT. b. Uncertain . As long as the allocation is an interior solution in the Edgeworth box, the marginal rates of substitution must be equal across individuals. This need not be true, however, at the corners where one consumer has all the goods in the economy. c. False . A policy that leads to a Pareto improvement results in greater efficiency, but social welfare depends on equity as well as efficiency. A policy that improves efficiency but creates a loss in equity might reduce social welfare. d. False. Moving to a point on the utility possibilities curve may not result in a Pareto improvement because one party may receive less utility on the curve than they received at the interior point.
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Part 2 – Public Expenditure: Public Goods and Externalities 4 - 1 Chapter 4 – Public Goods Brief Outline 1. Public Goods Defined 2. Efficient Provision of Public Goods a. Deriving the Efficiency Condition b. Problems in Achieving Efficiency c. The Free Rider Problem 3. Privatization a. Public versus Private Provision b. Public versus Private Production 4. Public Goods and Public Choice Answers to End - of - Chapter Questions 1. a. Wilderness area is an impure public good – at some point, consumption becomes nonrival; it is, however, nonexcludable. b. Satellite televis ion is nonrival in consump tion, although it is excludable; therefore it is an impure public good . c. Medical school education is a private good. d. Television signals are nonrival in consumption and not excludable (when broadcast over the air) . Therefore, they are a public good. e. An automatic teller machine is rival in consumption , at least at peak times . It is also excludable as only those patrons with ATM cards that are accepted by the machine can use the machine. Therefore the ATM is a private good. 2. a. False. Efficient provision of a public good o ccurs at the level where total willingness to pay for an additional unit equals the marginal cost of producing the additional unit. b. False. Due to the free rider problem, it is unlikel y that a private business firm could profitably sell a product that is non - excludable. Ho wever, recent research reveals that the free rider problem is an empirical q uestion and that we should not take the answer for granted. Public goods may be privately supported through volunteerism, such as when people who attend a fireworks display voluntarily contribute enough to pay for the show. c. Uncertain. This statement is true if the road is not congested, but when there is heavy traffic, adding another vehicle can interfere wi th the drivers already using the road. d. False. There will be more users in larger communities, but all users have access to the quantity that has been provided since the good is non rival, so there is no
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Chapter 4 – Public Goods 4 - 2 reasons larger communities would necessarily have to provide a larger quantity of the non rival good. 3. We assume that Cheetah’s utility does not enter the social welfare function; hence, her allocation of labor supply across activities does not matter. a. The public good is patrol; the private good is fruit. b. Recall that efficiency requires MRS TARZAN + MRS JANE = MRT. MRS TARZAN = MRS JANE = 2. But MRT = 3. Therefore, MRS TARZAN + MRS JANE MRT. To achieve an efficient allocation, Cheetah should patrol more. 4. The Search for Extra - Terrestrial Intelligence is a public good because it is nonrival and presumably non - excludable . The government should pay for the research only if the S MB is greater than the S MC. 5. Wine and liquor are both rival and excludable goods, so public sector production is not justified on the basis of public goods. Therefore, it makes no economic sense to have public production. 6. It is unlikely that if Pemex were privatized that the situation would lead to a monopoly situation. Comparing oil production to telephone service is not a correct comparison. In the case of the telephone company, there was only one provider of telephone service. In the case of oil production, there would be only one producer in Mexico, but many competitors providing oil from which Mexico could buy. The newly privatized company would have to compete to sell its goods. It would likely become more efficient than the state run company because of this competition. 7. These amenities being present in private airports alone would not be enough to recommend that airports be privately run . If fliers desire such amenities, it is not clear that they cannot be provided in public airports via renting space. One would also need information on the cost of running the airports and distributional issues that might exist for publicly run airports versus privately run airports before recommending that airports be privately run. 8. The experimental results on free - riding suggest that members of the community might voluntarily contribute about half of the req uired amount. The reason these citizens wanted to use private fundraising was because the state government redistributed tax dollars from wealthy districts to poor districts (the so - called Robin Hood plan), so using private donations was a way to avoid losing tax dollars to other districts. 9. Books are not a public good. They are both rival (two people cannot read a book at the same time) and excludable (you can keep a person from reading a book). But if the goods libraries provide are a sense of community or a better educated populace, these would qualify as public goods. If the public good aspect of the library is to produce a better educated populace, then perhaps the classic books are a better choice.
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Part 2 – Public Expenditure: Public Goods and Externalities 4 - 3 10. Hiring p rivate military firms to provide military support in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Darfur would be similar to the example of airport security in the text. One might argue that a private firm would not provide adequate training, use unethical or especially aggressive methods to shorten the conflict, thus lowering costs to increase profits. Proponents would argue that such things could be stipulated in a well - written contract. However, no contract can specify every possible contingency. In high conflict situations this may be especially true as the opposing side will not be predictable. 11. a. Zach’s marginal benefit schedule shows that the marginal benefit of a lighthouse starts at $90 and declines, and Jacob’s marginal benefit starts at $40 and declines. Neither person values the first lighthouse at its marginal cost of $100, so neither person would be willing to pay for a lighthouse acting alone. b. Zach ’s mar ginal benefit is MB ZACH = 90 - Q , and Jacob ’s is MB JACOB = 40 - Q . The marginal benefit for society as a whole is the sum of the two marginal benefits, or MB= 13 0 - 2Q (for Q ≤4 0 ), and is equal to Zach ’s marginal benefit schedule afterwards (for Q >4 0 ). The marginal cost is constant at MC= 100, so the intersection of aggregate marginal benefit and marginal cost occurs at a quantity less than 40 . Setting MB=MC gives 13 0 - 2Q =1 00 , or Q = 15. Net benefit can be measured as the area between the demand curve and the marginal benefit of the 15 th unit. The net benefit is $112.5 for each person, for a total of $225. 12. Each day the private decision of each shepherd would equate private cost with private benefit. Therefore, 7 would show up because then each shepherd would graze four sheep . If the shepherds graze less than four sheep , then they will stay home. The net benefits to society are 0 sheep (the benefit to the seven shepherds is 4 sheep (7x4=28) and the cost to society is 4 sheep per shepherd (7x4=28)). The efficient number of shepherds to show up at the meadow is the number that will maximize social net benefits, which happens where the social marginal benefit equals the social marginal cost. This occurs at four shepherds , where the net social benefits equal 12 sheep (4x7 – 4x4) . Access to the meadow is an impure public good. It is rival – if one shepherd has access to the meadow , the others have less access. It is, however, non - excludable because it is difficult to keep shepherd from grazing the meadow . 13. Britney ’s marginal benefit is MB BRITNEY =12 - Z, and Paris ’s is MB PARIS =8 - 2Z. The marginal benefit for society as a whole is the sum of the two marginal benefits, or MB=20 - 3Z (for Z≤4), and is equal to Britney ’s marginal benefit schedule afterwards (for Z>4). The marginal cost is constant at MC=16. Setting MB=MC along the first segment gives 20 - 3Z=16, or Z=4/3, which is the efficient level of snowplowing. Note that if either Brit ney or Paris had to pay for the entire cost herself, no snowplowing would occur since the marginal cost of $16 exceeds either of their individual marginal benefits from the first unit ($12 or $8). Thus, this is clearly a situation when the private market does not wo rk very well. Also note, however, that if the marginal cost were somewhat lower, (e.g., MC≤8), then it is possible that Paris could credibly free ride, and Britney would provide the efficient allocation. This occurs because if Britney believes that Paris will free ride, Britney provides her optimal allocation, which occurs on the second segment of society’s MB curve, which is identical to Britney ’s MB curve (note that Paris gets zero
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Chapter 4 – Public Goods 4 - 4 marginal benefit for Z>4). Since Paris is completely satiated with this good at Z=4, her threat to free ride is credit if Britney provides Z>4. See the graph below. MB Britney MB Paris
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Part 2 – Public Expenditure: Public Goods and Externalities 5 - 1 Chapter 5 – Externalities Brief Outline 1. The Nature of Externalities 2. Graphical Analysis a. Implications b. Conclusion 3. Private Responses a. Bargaining and the Coase Theorem b. Mergers c. Social Conventions 4. Public Responses to Externalities : Taxes and Subsidies a. Taxes b. Subsidies 5. Public Responses to Externalities: Emissions Fees and Cap - and - Trade Programs a. Emissions Fee b. Cap - and - Trade c. Emissions Fee versus Cap - and - Trade d. Command - and - Control Regulation 6. The US Response a. Progress with Incentive - Based Approaches 7. Implications for Income Distributions a. Who Benefits? b. Who Bears the Cost? 8. Positive Externalities a. A Cautionary Note Answers to End - of - Chapter Questions 1. Before passengers were charged for checked bags, they would choose whether to check bags or carry them on based on whether they were willing to trade time for the hassle of dealing with carry - on bags. That is, passengers who valued saving time by not having to deal with baggage claim more than the cost of dealing with carry - on baggage will choose to carry on. The fact that passengers are now charged for checked baggage but not for baggage carried onto the plane will inefficiently allocate overhead space . Passengers will carry on more and bigger bags to save the fee charged , resulting in full overhead luggage containers. Overhead space will go to the first passengers on the plane, rather than being distributed more evenly. Bags checked (without a charge) at the gate forces some who would choose to carry on even without the fee to have to check, which is a loss in efficiency. Those who elect to carry on to avoid the fee, but would rather check their bags , also result in an inefficiency. 2. The Coase theorem suggests that the church and the comedy club could negotiate. If the church possessed the right to the “noise” in the building, the comedy club could pay the church to be quiet. If the comedy club possessed the right to quiet in the building, the church could compensate the club for the noise.
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Chapter 5 - Externalities 5 - 2 3. It is the case that a carbon tax would be passed on to the consumer. The tax raises costs to the producer for producing the final good. These increased costs would decrease supply, which will increase the price of that final good. In a cap and trade system, businesses must purchase permits in order to emit carbon. If the cost of purchasing and using abatement equipment is less than the cost of buying a permit, the business will use abatement equipment . In either case (buying a permit or using abatement equipment) cost s for the producer increase, decreasing supply and increasing the price of the final good. If the carbon tax and the number of permits issued in the cap and trade system were set appropriately, the outlays for both programs would be the same. 4. a. The number of parties per month that would be provided privately is P. b. See schedule MSB p. c. P*. Give a per - unit subsidy of $b per party to induce the correct number of parties . d. The optimal subsidy is $b. The total subsidy= abcd . “Society” comes out ahead by ghc , assuming the subsidy can be raised without any efficiency costs. (Cassanova’s friends gain gchd ; Cassanova loses chd but gains abcd , which is a subsidy cost to government.) 5. The payment for signing a waiver is a negotiation as suggested by the Coase Theorem . If residents accept the payment and sign the waiver, they are signaling that the noise cost to them is less than the payment. If the residents choose not to accept the payment and sign the waiver, the payment is not great enough to cover the cost of the noise. The Coase Theorem suggest in this case that further negotiation could occur. 6. On the surface, the tax on saturated fat seems like a Pigouvian tax, if you assume that the $3 is equivalent to the level of the damage from the saturated fats. The commentator is not correct in his criticism that the tax is levied on an input rather an outcome. If the tax is properly set and is the direct cause of unhealthy consumers, the efficient level of saturated fat will be consumed. However, this tax suffers from the problem of assuming that the saturated fat leads directly to poor health outcomes and is the only source of unhealthy outcomes. Some consumers are healthy no matter the level of consumption of
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Part 2 – Public Expenditure: Public Goods and Externalities 5 - 3 saturated fats. Others are unhealthy even with no consumption of the saturated fats. And many consumers will simply reallocate their consumption to nontaxed unhealthy foods. 7. a. It is very likely that the farmer could negotiate with the neighbors, provided property rights are clearly defined. The Coase Theorem is therefore applicable. b. It is unlikel y that negotiation could result in an efficient outcome in this case. It is likely that there are a great number of farmers involved in both harvesting ants and growing trees, making negotiation very difficult. c. Property rights are not being enforced, making negotiation through the Coase Theorem impossible . d. T here are t oo many people involved for private negotiation. 8. a. The price of imported oil does not reflect the increased political risk by effectively subsidizing authoritarian regimes like those in Saudi Arabia. b. The tax would estimate the marginal damage (e.g., the increased instability in the Middle East, etc.) by importing oil from Saudi Arabia. c. The supply of TGRs is vertical at 1 04.5 billion if government seeks to reduce consumption of gasoline to 104.5 billion. Consumers must have one TGR in order to buy one gallon of gasoline, plus they must pay the price at the pump. Limiting TGRs effectively limits the demand for gasoline, so the price per gallon will fall, but consumers must have TGRs in order to purchase gasoline. If the market price of one TGR is $0.75, this means that supply and demand intersect at $0.75, as shown in the graph. This kind of program curbs consumption without giving government more revenue because consumers are purchasing the TGRs from each other. However, the total amount of TGRs is limited by government. Those consumers seeking to purchase more gasoline than allowed by the initial allocation of TGRs can purchase additional TGRs from other consumers at the market price of $0.75. By choosing to use a TGR to purchase gasoline, a consumer incurs an opportunity cost equal to $0.75 since they cannot sell the TGR once it has been used.
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Chapter 5 - Externalities 5 - 4 9. The use of the drug to treat sick cows leads to a positive externality (the benefit enjoyed by air travelers) as well as a negative externality (the costs created by a larger number of rats and feral dogs). Banning the drug might raise or lower efficiency, depending on whether the positive externality is larger or whether the n egative externality is larger. There are many ways to design incentive - based regulations. Policymakers could determine the efficient level of drug usage and then either allocate or sell the right to use the drug for sick cows. 10. The program matches prices to changes in demand, fluctuating as demand changes . This results in higher efficiency. Drivers will respond efficiently by choosing to park based on their willingness to pay. 11. a. When the Little Pigs hog farm produces on it s own, it sets marginal benefit equal to marginal cost. This occurs at 4 units. b. The efficient number of hogs sets marginal benefit equal to marginal social cost, which is the sum of M C and MD. At 2 units, MB=MSC=1600 . c. The efficient number of hogs sets marginal benefit equal to marginal social costs. At 3 hogs, MB=MSC=1600. 12. Private Marginal Benefit = 10 - X Private Marginal Cost = $5 TGRs $ 104.5 billion Supply of TGRs Demand for TGRs $0.75
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Part 2 – Public Expenditure: Public Goods and Externalities 5 - 5 External Cost = $2 Without government intervention, PMB = PMC; X = 5 units. Social efficiency implies PMB = Social Marginal Costs = $5 + $2 = $7; X = 3 units. Gain to society is the area of the triangle whose base is the distance between the efficient and actual output levels, and whose height is the difference between private and social marginal cost. Hence, the efficiency gain is ½ (5 - 3)(7 - 5) = 2 A Pigouvian tax adds to the private marginal cost the amount of the external cost at the socially optimal level of production. Here a simple tax of $2 per unit will lead to efficient production. This tax would raise ($2) (3 units) = $6 in revenue. 13. a. The total cost of emissions reduction is minimized only when the marginal costs are equal across all polluters, therefore a cost - effective solution requires that MC 1 = MC 2 or that 300e 1 = 100e 2 . Substituting 3e 1 for e 2 in the formula e 1 + e 2 = 40 (since the policy goal is to reduce emissions by 40 units) yields the solution. It is cost - effective for Firm 1 to reduce emissions by 10 un its and for Firm 2 to reduce emissions by 30 units. b. In order to achieve cost - effective emission reductions , the emissions fee should be set equal to $3,000. With this emissions fee, Firm 1 reduces 10 units and Firm 2 reduces 30 units, but Firm 1 has to pay $3,000 for each unit of pollution they continue to produce, which gives them a tax burden of $3,000 x 90 (Firm 1 generated 100 units in the absence of government intervention) or $270,000. Firm 2 has a lower tax burden because it is reducin g emissions from 80 units to 50 units. Firm 2 pays $3,000 x 50 = $150,000. As the t ext concludes, the firm that cuts back pollution less isn’t really getting away wi th anything because it has a larger tax liability than if it were to cut back more. c. From an efficiency standpoint, the initial allocation of permits does not matter. If the two firms could not trade permits, then Firm 2 wo uld have to undertake all of the emissions reduction. Initially, Firm 1’s MC i s zero, while Firm 2’s MC is $4,000, so there is a strong incentive for Firm 2 to pu rchase permits from Firm 1. Trading should continue until MC 1 = MC 2 , which is t he cost - effective solution. This means that the market price for permits will e qual $3,000, the same as the emissions fee. At this price, Firm 2 will purc hase 10 permits from Firm 2, allowing Firm 2 to reduce emissions by 30 rather than 40 and requiring Firm 1 to reduce emissions by 10. This solution is the same a s the solution achieved with the emissions fee. However, Firm 1 is better off beca use instead of having to pay taxes, it will receive a payment of $30,000 for its perm its. Firm 2 must pay $30,000 for the extra permits, but it also avoid s the payment of taxes. The government lost $420,000 in tax revenue. The firm s must still pay the cost of emissions reduction, plus Firm 2 must pay for the permits purchased from Firm 1.
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Chapter 5 - Externalities 5 - 6 14. I f marginal costs turn out to be lower than anticipated, cap - and - trade achieves too little pollution reduction and an emissions fee achieves too much pollution reduction. With an inelastic marginal social benefit function, cap - and - trade is not too bad from an efficiency standpoint, while an emissions fee causes pollution reduction to be much greater than the efficient level when marginal cost is lower than anticipated. When marginal social benefits are elastic, the opposite is true.
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Part 2 – Public Expenditure: Public Goods and Externalities 6 - 1 Chapter 6 – Political Economy Brief Outline 1. Direct democracy a. Unanimity Rules b. Majority Voting Rules c. Logrolling d. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem 2. Representative Democracy a. Elected Politicians b. Public Employees c. Special Interests d. Other Actors 3. Explaining Government Growth a. Conclusion Answers to End - of - Chapter Questions 1. a. Below, the preferences for each person. b. C wins in every pair wise vote. Thus, there is a stable majority outcome, despite the fact that persons 1, 2, and 3 have double - peaked preferences. This demonstrates that although multi - peaked preferences may lead to voting inconsistencies, this is not necessarily the case. 2. The passage of the agriculture bill in 2007 is consistent with the logrolling model. Because the members of rural areas were able to trade votes with those in urban areas 3. a. Neither issue would pass with majority voting as in both cases, two voters of the three would vote against the each issue because they receive negative net benefits. 1 2 3 4 A B C D Person 1 Person 2 Person 3 Person 4 Person 5
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Chapter 6 – Political Economy 6 - 2 This is not efficient because issue X has a positive total net benefit and should be funded. b. With logrolling, voters A and B can trade votes. A will vote for issue Y if B votes for issue X, but C will not vote for either project. Both issues will pass with two votes for and one against. This is not efficient because issue Y has a negative total net benefit. c. If side payments were allowed A could pay B to vote for issue X (A would not pay C because C would require a higher payment than B), and B could pay A or C to vote for issue Y. This would result in the same inefficient outcome as in b. d. If side payments were allowed A would have to pay B at least 1 to vote for issue X. A would only be willing to pay less than 6. B would have to pay A or C at least 3, but no more than 4 to entice him to vote for issue Y. 4. Y es, it is consistent, because the theory says that when unanimity is required, no decisions are likely to be made. A majority system might be more suitable, although it is subject to cycling and other problems. 5. When the policy changed to allow and encourage female voting, female voters became the majority, so it is sensible that the median voter is now a woman . Given this, the median voter theorem suggests that politicians should shift their positions to more closely align with the views of women . 6. When there is a vote over five options, there is the chance that a potential majority vote is split between four relatively preferred options, and the fifth option wins. The winning option may have been voted down if it had been a two - way vote with any of the other options. Further, if preferences are not single - peaked, cycling and inconsistent public decisions may emerge.
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Part 2 – Public Expenditure: Public Goods and Externalities 6 - 3 7. On the graph below, the price of taxi rides would increase from P C to P Med and the number of taxi rides would decline from Q C to Q Med . This would result in a deadweight loss to society of triangle dce . 8. a. With the demand curve of Q=100 - 10P and a perfectl y elastic supply curve at P=2, the milk is sold at a price of $2, and a quantity of 80 units is sold. b. Th e marginal revenue curve associated with the inverse demand curve P=10 - (1/10)Q is MR=10 - (1/5)Q, while the marginal cost curve is MC=2. The cartel would ideally produce a quantity where MR=MC, or 10 - (1/5)Q=2, or Q=40. The price associated with a cartel quantity of 40 units is P=10 - (1/10)*40, or P=6. c. The rent associated with the cartel is the product of the marginal profit per unit and the number of units produced. The marginal profit per unit of milk is $4 (=$6 price - $2 marginal cost), while 40 units are produced. Thus, the rents equal $160. d. The most the cartel would be willing to contribute to politicians is the full economic rent of $160. The cartel situation, the quantity of milk produced is too low from society’s point of view. The deadweight loss triangle is computed using the difference between the cartel output and competitive output as the “base” of the triangle, and the difference between the cartel price and competitive price as the “height.” Thus, the triangle is equal to (1/2)*(80 - 40)*($6 - $2)=$40. e. As Figure 6.5 in the textbook shows, the deadweight loss could now go as high as the sum of the conventional deadweight loss and the rents, or $160 rents + $80 DWL = $240. This is because, as noted in the text , “rent - seeking can use up Q med S=MC Number of taxi rides $ D MR Q C P C P Med f c b a d e
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Chapter 6 – Political Economy 6 - 4 resources – lobbyists spend their time influencing legislators, consultants testify before regulatory panels, and advertisers conduct public relations campaigns. Such resources, which could have been used to produce new goods and services, are instead consumed in a struggle over the distribution of existing goods and services. Hence, the rents do not represent a mere lump - sum transfer; it is a measure of real resources used up to maintain a position of market power.” 9. This is an example of possible rent - seeking. If Philip Morris supports limited cigarette advertising, it is unlikely that there will be new entrants in the cigarette market because establishing business would be more difficult with reduced advertising. Philip Morris will maintain or develop market power. 10. a. The outcome of the first election (M vs. H) is M. The outcome of the second election (H vs. L) is L. The outcome of the third election (L vs. M) is M. Majority rule leads to a stable outcome since M defeats both H and L. Giving one person the ability to set the agenda would not affect the outcome in this case. b. With the change in Eleanor’s preference ordering, majority rule no longer generates a stable outcome. In a vote between M and H, the outcome is H. In a vote between H and L, the outcome is L. In a vote between L and M, the outcome is M. So, giving one person the ability to set the agenda affects the outcome. For example, Abigail prefers H, so she might pit L against M first in order to eliminate L and avoid having L defeat H.
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Part 2 – Public Expenditure: Public Goods and Externalities 7 - 1 Chapter 7 – Education Brief Outline 1. Justifying Government Intervention in Education a. Is Education a Public Good? b. Does Education Generate Positive Externalities? c. Is the Education Market Inequitable? 2. What Can Government Intervention in Education Accomplish? a. Does Government intervention Crowd Out Private Education? b. Does Government Spending Improve Educational Outcomes? c. Public Spending and the Quality of Education d. Does Education Increase Earnings? 3. New Directions for Public Education a. Charter Schools b. Vouchers c. School Accountability Answers to End - of - Chapter Questions 1. There are numerous rationales given for government provision of education. Even though education is primarily a private good, many argue that educating a child provides external benefits. However, the existence of a positive externality implies that government should subsidize education rather than making it free and mandatory. Other rationales are based on equity, including a belief in commodity egalitarianism. The rationales do imply a lower level of provision of higher education versus primary and secondary. Higher education has higher private benefits and fewer externalities, therefore requires a lower level of provision. 2. It may be that national income is increased purely though private returns to education summed up across the economy. If this is the case, one could not use an externality - based argument to justify subsidization. However, i f education quality increases the growth rate of national income outside of the returns that accrue to individuals who consume the education , then private decisions will yield a lower than efficient level of education quality. This reasoning would allow for government subsidization that would improve the quality of education. 3. If students are required to pay “a lifelong tithe on all earnings” there might be a distortion in choices of careers among students. Under the tithe system, some students would choose a lower paid (and less productive) career path, compared to the situation in which they faced a standard bank loan. The tithe system would create inefficiencies by partially removing incentives for students to pursue the highest - paying jobs. 4. If households are allowed to supplement public education with private lessons, then the budget constraint in Figure 7.1 of the textbook is modified by drawing a line starting at point x (consuming only public education) that runs to the southeast and is parallel to AB. The figure below is then similar to the analysis of in - kind benefits like food stamps.
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Chapter 7 – Education 7 - 2 If parents pay for the public schooling (rather than perceiving it as being free), and the schooling was paid for with a lump sum tax, then the budget constraint shifts in by an amount that depends on the household’s share of the tax burden. If the household’s tax burden exactly equals the cost of public school, the budget constraint is no longer the line segment AB but rather the segment CDB , where the segment DB runs along the original budget constraint, except that the minimum amount of schooling consumed is e P . 5. Making wealthy students pay more tuition only increases efficiency if it is reasonable to assume that wealthy students will be paid more than less wealthy students at the end of the education. If there are few externalities, then the demand for education should come from the private benefits of the education, which is the present value of future earnings. If wealthy students are paid better after college, their demand would be higher and they would be willing to pay more for the education. In terms of equity, this policy seems to be fair in that it gives less wealthy students a better chance at an education . D C e p BA A Other Goods Education Public School is financed by taxes levied on parents e p B A A Other Goods Education Parents can s upplement public education with private lessons
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