Introduction to Political Culture Part 2

the pluralist model
the dominant-ideology model
the elite-values model
the market model

Political socialization is the process through which individuals acquire political beliefs and values, and by which these are transmitted from one generation to the next. Families and schools are usually viewed as 'primary' agents of political socialization, while the workplace, peer groups and the media are viewed as 'secondary' agents of political socialization. Interest in political socialization peaked during the so-called 'behavioural revolution', as external stimuli were seen to explain (and possibly determine) political attitudes or behaviour.

Pluralism (see p. 101) highlights diversity and multiplicity generally. The pluralist model of the mass media portrays the media as an ideological marketplace in which a wide range of political views are debated and discussed. While not rejecting the idea that the media can affect political views and sympathies, this nevertheless suggests that their impact is essentially neutral, in that they tend to reflect the balance of forces within society at large.
The pluralist view, nevertheless, portrays the media in strongly positive terms. In ensuring an 'informed citizenry', the mass media both enhance the quality of democracy and guarantee that government power is checked. This 'watchdog' role was classically demonstrated in the 1974 Washington Post investigation into the Watergate scandal, which led to the resignation of Richard Nixon as US president. Some, moreover, argue that the advent of the digital media, and particularly the internet, has strengthened pluralism and political competition by giving protest groups, including 'anti-capitalist' activists, a relatively cheap and highly effective means of disseminating information and organizing campaigns, as discussed later in the chapter. However, the pluralist model suffers from significant deficiencies. For example, weak and unorganized groups are excluded from access to mainstream publishing and broadcasting, meaning that the media's ideological marketplace tends to be relatively narrow and generally pro-establishment in character. In addition, private ownership and formal independence from government may not be sufficient to guarantee the media's oppositional character in the light of the increasingly symbiotic relationship between government and journalists and broadcasters.

The dominant-ideology model portrays the mass media as a politically conservative force that is aligned to the interests of economic and social elites, and serves to promote compliance or political passivity amongst the masses. In its Marxist version, rooted in the larger Marxist critique of political culture (discussed earlier in the chapter) and particularly the ideas of Gramsci, it suggests that the media propagate bourgeois ideas and maintain capitalist hegemony, acting in the interests of major corporations and media moguls. Ownership, in other words, ultimately determines the political and other views that the mass media disseminate, and ownership is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small number of global media conglomerates. The largest include Facebook, Google (Alphabet), Comcast, News Corporation, Viacom, Disney, CBS and Bertelsmann. From this perspective, the media play an important role in promoting globalization (see p. 161), in that their tendency to spread ideas, images and values that are compatible with Western consumerism (see p. 180) helps to open up new markets and extend business penetration worldwide.

One ofthe most influential and sophisticated versions ofthe dominant-ideology model was developed by Noam Chomsky (see p. 205) and Ed Herman in Manufacturing Consent (2006), in the form of the 'propaganda model'. They identified five 'filters' through which news and political coverage are distorted by the structures of the media itself. These filters are as follows:
the business interests of owner companies a sensitivity to the views and concerns of advertisers and sponsors
the sourcing of news and information from 'agents of power', such as governments and business-backed think-tanks
'flak' or pressure applied to journalists, including threats of legal action
an unquestioning belief in the benefits of market competition and consumer capitalism.

Chomsky's analysis emphasizes the degree to which the mass media can subvert democracy, helping, for example, to mobilize popular support in the USA for imperialist foreign policy goals. The dominant-ideology model is, nevertheless, also subject to criticism. Objections to it include that it underestimates the extent to which the press and broadcasters, particularly public service broadcasters, pay attention to progressive social, racial and development issues. Moreover, the assumption that media output shapes political attitudes is determinist and neglects the role played by people's own values in filtering, and possibly resisting, media messages.

The
elite-values model shifts attention away from the ownership of media
corporations to the mechanism through which media output is controlled. This view suggests that editors, journalists and broadcasters enjoy significant professional independence, and that even the most interventionist of media moguls are able only to set a broad political agenda, but not to control day-to-day editorial decision-making. The media's political bias (see p. 207) therefore reflects the values of groups that are disproportionally represented amongst its senior professionals. However, there are a number of versions of this model, depending on the characteristics that are considered to be politically significant.
One version of the elite-values model holds that the anti-socialist and politically conservative views of most mainstream newspapers, magazines and television stations derive from the fact that their senior professionals are well-paid and generally from middle-class backgrounds. A quite different version is sometimes advanced by conservatives, who believe that the media reflect the views of university-educated,
liberal intellectuals, whose values and concerns are quite different from those of the mass of the population. In its feminist version, this model highlights the predominance of males amongst senior journalists and broadcasters, implying that this both explains the inadequate attention given to women's views and issues by the mass media, and accounts for the confrontational style of interviewing and political discussion sometimes adopted by broadcasters and journalists. Although the elite-values model helps to explain why the range of political views expressed by the mass media is often more restricted than pluralists suggest, it also has its limitations. Chief amongst these is that it fails to take full enough account of the pressures that bear upon senior media professionals; these, for example, include the views and interests of owners and commercial considerations; notably, 'ratings' figures.

The market model of the mass media differs from the other models, in that it dispenses with the idea of media bias: it holds that newspapers and television reflect, rather than shape, the views of the general public. This occurs because, regardless of the personal views of media owners and senior professionals, private media outlets are, first and foremost, businesses concerned with profit maximization and thus with extending market share. The media therefore give people 'what they want', and cannot afford to alienate existing or potential viewers or readers by presenting political viewpoints with which they may disagree. Such considerations may be less pressing in relation to public service broadcasters, such as the BBC, which are more insulated from commercial and advertiser pressures but, even here, the tyranny of 'ratings' is increasingly evident. Nevertheless, although this model dispenses with the idea that at least the privately owned mass media should be seen as part of the political process, it helps to explain some significant trends in political life. One of these may be growing popular disenchantment with politics resulting from the trivialization of political coverage. Fearful of losing 'market share', television companies in particular have reduced their coverage of serious political debate, and thus abandoned their responsibility for educating and informing citizens, in favour of 'infotainment'

The impact that the media have on democracy is one of the most widely debated aspects of the relationship between the media and politics. For many, the existence of a free press is one of the key features of democratic governance. However, how do the media act as custodians of democracy? And why have some questioned the media's democratic credentials, even arguing that they may undermine it? The media has traditionally been said to promote democracy in two key ways: by fostering public debate and political engagement, and by acting as a 'public watchdog' to check abuses of power. (The specific impact of social media on democracy and politics more generally is considered later in the chapter.) The capacity to provide a civic forum in which meaningful and serious political debate can take place is often viewed as the key democratic role of the media. The virtue of this is that better-informed citizens with more independent and considered views will be more politically engaged. The media are therefore agents of political education. Indeed, the media may have largely replaced formal representative institutions, such as assemblies, parliaments and local councils, as arenas for the dialogue, debate and deliberation that are the very stuff of democratic politics. This has happened because the media are, arguably, better-suited to this role than are traditional representative bodies. In addition to offering the public perhaps its only meaningful opportunity to watch politicians in action (through, for example, interviews with politicians and televised assembly debates), the media provide a forum for the expression of a much wider range of viewpoints and opinions than is possible within representative institutions composed only of elected politicians. Thus, academics and scientists, business leaders and trade union bosses, and representatives of interest groups and lobbyists of all kinds are able to express views and engage in public debate through the mechanism of media. Not only do the media substantially widen the range of views and opinions expressed in political debate, but they also present debate and discussion in a way that is lively and engaging for the general public, devoid of the formality, even stuffiness, that characterizes the exchanges that take place in assemblies and council chambers around the world.

he 'watchdog' role of the media is, in a sense, a subset of the political debate argument. The role of the media, from this perspective, is to ensure that public accountability takes place, by scrutinizing the activities of government and exposing abuses of power. Once again, in carrying out this role the media is supplementing and, to some extent, replacing the work of formal representative institutions. Media professionals such as researchers, journalists and television presenters are particularly suited to this role because they are 'outside' politics and have no interest other than to expose incompetence, corruption, or simply muddled thinking whenever and wherever it can be found. By contrast, if public accountability is left solely in the hands of professional politicians, it may be constrained by the fact that those who attempt to expose ineptitude or wrongdoing wish themselves, at some stage, to hold government power. This may not only taint their motives, but it may also discourage them from criticizing processes and practices that they may wish to take advantage of in the future. However, the media can only perform this role effectively if they are properly independent, and not dominated by government. Democratic governance therefore requires either that the publicly financed media are accountable to an independent commission, or that there is an appropriate level of competition from 'free' or privately financed media. The example of WikiLeaks nevertheless highlights how controversial the media's 'watchdog' role can be in practice

Political bias Political bias refers to political views that
systematically favour the values or interests of one group over another as opposed to 'balanced' or 'objective' beliefs. Bias, however, may take various forms (McQuail, 1992). Partisan bias is
explicit and deliberately promoted (newspaper editorials). Propaganda bias is deliberate but unacknowledged
('lazy' students or 'militant' Muslims). Unwitting bias occurs through the use of seemingly professional
considerations (the 'newsworthiness' of a story). Ideological bias operates on the basis of assumptions and value judgements that are embedded in a particular belief system (wealth is gained through talent and hard work).

However, reservations have also been expressed about the capacity of the media to promote effective democratic governance. The first of these, as advanced by dominant-ideology and elite-values theorists, is that, far from providing citizens with a wide and balanced range of political views, the content of the media is tainted by clear political biases. Whether political bias stems from the opinions and values of editors, journalists and broadcasters, or from a more general alignment between the interests of the media and those of economic and social elites, it is difficult to see how the media's duty to provide objective information and remain faithful to public-service principles can be discharged reliably and consistently in practice. Particular emphasis has, in this respect, been placed on the implications of media ownership, and the fact that the views and interests of major corporations or powerful media moguls cannot but, at some level, influence media output. Insofar as the mass media affects the political agenda, this agenda is likely to be politically conservative and, at least, compatible with the interests of dominant groups in society.
Second, as the mass media is not subject to public accountability, it is the classic example of 'power without responsibility' (Curran and Seaton, 2009). However well-informed, knowledgeable and stimulating the views of journalists and broadcasters may be, and however eager they may be to portray themselves as the 'voice of the people', media professionals - unlike elected politicians - 'represent' no one other than themselves, and have no meaningful basis for claiming to articulate public opinion. Third, there are reasons for doubting the independence of the media from government. All too often, a symbiotic relationship develops between media professionals and the political elite which constrains both the mass media's political views and their capacity to act as an effective 'watchdog'.

Apart from its impact (for good or ill) on democracy, the prominence of the mass media in an 'information age' has affected the processes of governance (see p. 74) through the transformation of political leadership. The chief way in which the media has transformed political leadership is through growing interest in the personal lives and private conduct of senior political figures, at the expense of serious and 'sober' policy and ideological debate. This, in part, stems from the media's, and particularly television's, obsession with image rather than issues, and with personality rather than policies. In the UK and other parliamentary systems, it is evident in a tendency towards the 'presidentialization', or 'Americanization', of politics (as discussed in Chapter 13). Such trends reflect not so much conscious bias on the part of the media, as an attempt to 'sell' politics to a mass audience that is deemed to be little interested in issues and policies. This also accounts for the tendency to treat elections as 'horse races', the public's attention being focused less on the policy significance of the outcome and more on who is going to win. These two tendencies invariably coincide, turning elections into 'beauty contests' between leading politicians, each of whom serves as the 'brand image' of their party. Leaders are therefore judged largely on the basis of their 'televisual' skills (relaxed manner, sense of humour, ability to demonstrate the 'popular touch', and so on), rather than their mastery of political issues and capacity for serious political debate. However, has exposing leading politicians to the unrelenting glare of media attention merely given them celebrity status, or has media attention affected the location of power within the governmental system?

here can be little doubt that the advent of the 'media age' has changed the behaviour of political leaders, as well as affected the career prospects of individual politicians. For example, presentational factors, such as personal appearance, hairstyle, dress sense, and so on, have become more important in determining political preferment or advancement. However, such developments have not merely changed the 'face' of modern politics; they have reordered power relationships both within the political executive and between the executive and the assembly. The growth of 'celebrity politics' gives presidents, prime ministers and other party leaders the ability to make personalized appeals to the voters, creating the phenomenon of spatial leadership. This allows leaders to appeal 'over the heads' of their senior colleagues, parties and government institutions, directly to the public. Furthermore, the messages they give, and the policy and ideological stances they adopt, are increasingly determined by leading politicians personally, supported, it appears, by an ever-expanding band of public relations consultants, 'spin doctors', media managers, pollsters and publicity directors.

One of the consequences of this is that junior politicians may have an additional reason for deferring to their leaders: their fear of damaging their leader's image and reputation. If the leader is damaged, especially by splits and internal criticism, all members of his or her party or government suffer. Political power thus comes to be structured on the basis of the publicity and media attention received by individual politicians. The greater the media attention, the greater the political leverage. However, media attention is far from an unqualified benefit for political leaders. Although their triumphs and successes can be publicly trumpeted, their flaws, failings and transgressions can also be ruthlessly exposed. Indeed, the ultimate vulnerability of contemporary political leaders may well be that negative media coverage may turn them into 'electoral liabilities', encouraging their parties and colleagues to remove them in order to 'save the party', or their own political careers.

Celebrity politics: Either or both the cultivation of 'celebrityhood' by elected politicians, or interventions by stars of popular culture into the political domain.

patial leadership: The tendency of political leaders to distance themselves from their parties and governments by presenting themselves as 'outsiders', or developing their own political stance or ideological position.

A further way in which the media has affected governance is through its impact on the political culture. The media is sometimes charged with having created a climate of corrosive cynicism amongst the public, leading to growing popular disenchantment with politics generally, and a lack of trust (see p. 466) in governments and politicians of all complexions (Lloyd, 2004). This may, in turn, be linked to trends that have afflicted mature democracies in particular, such as declining voter turnout and falling party membership. The UK is often seen as the most advanced example of such a media-driven 'culture of contempt', but similar tendencies are evident elsewhere; notably, in the USA, Australia and Canada. Why has this happened? A critical stance towards politicians in general and governments in particular is, of course, vital to the maintenance of democratic governance. However, the distinction between legitimate criticism and systematic and relentless negativity may, in practice, be difficult to
uphold. This occurs, in part, because increasingly intense commercial pressures have forced the media to make their coverage of politics 'sexy' and attention-grabbing. The media, after all, is a business, and this places inevitable pressure on the coverage of news and current affairs. Facts are absorbed progressively more quickly into a swirl of comment and interpretation, blurring, seemingly altogether, the distinction between what happens and what it means. Similarly, routine political debate and policy analysis receive less and less attention, as the media focus instead on - or 'hype' - scandals of various kinds and allegations of incompetence, policy failure or simple inertia. Leading politicians have, as a result, come to live in a kind of ongoing reality-television programme, the sole purpose of which appears to be to embarrass and denigrate them at every possible turn. The public, for their part, tend to view politicians as untrustworthy and deceitful, according them the same level of respect they would accord any other reality-television programme participant.

The final way in which the media has influenced governance is through its impact on the policy-making process. This has happened in at least two ways. The first is that, just like everyone else in society, government is bombarded by a much greater quantity of information arriving almost immediately. Knowing too much can sometimes be as dangerous as knowing too little. An example of this can be found in the USA's inability to predict and prevent the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. The problem the USA faced was not that it lacked information about al-Qaeda, its plans and movements, but that the sheer quantity of national-security intelligence available made effective analysis almost impossible. Moreover, as news and information spreads around the globe at a faster pace, governments are forced to react to events more quickly, and often before they have been fully discussed and digested. An age of '24/7 news' inevitably becomes one of '24/7 government'. Politicians are encouraged, even forced, to take a stance on issues simply to avoid being criticized for inertia or inactivity, leaving little time for the analysis of policy options and their implications. Second, greater reliance on the media means that it is often the media, and not government, that sets the political agenda and dictates the direction of policy-making. For example, the fact that television pictures of the Asian tsunami in December 2004 were broadcast almost immediately across the globe, creating an outpouring of public sympathy for its victims and leading to unprecedented levels of private charitable donations, forced governments around the world, within days, to make substantial increases in the scale of their of aid and support.

The revolution in communication technologies, brought about since the 1990s, especially, by the spread of satellite and cable television, mobile phones, the internet and digital technology generally, has transformed the media and society, helping to create what has been called an 'information society' or a 'network society'

Postmaterialism Postmaterialism is a theory that explains the nature of political concerns and values in terms of levels of economic development. It is loosely based on Abraham Maslow's (1908-70) 'hierarchy of needs', which places esteem and self-actualization above material or economic needs. Postmaterialism assumes that conditions of material scarcity breed egoistical and acquisitive values, meaning that politics is dominated by economic issues. However, in conditions of widespread prosperity, individuals
express more interest in 'postmaterial' or 'quality of life' issues, typically concerned with morality, political justice and personal fulfilment.

Political socialization is the process through which individuals acquire political beliefs and values, and by which these are transmitted from one generation to the next. Families and schools are usually viewed as 'primary' agents of political socialization, while the workplace, peer groups and the media are viewed as 'secondary' agents of political socialization. Interest in political socialization peaked during the so-called 'behavioural revolution', as external stimuli were seen to explain (and possibly determine) political attitudes or behaviour.

the media have become increasingly powerful political actors and, in some respects, more deeply enmeshed in the political process. At least two developments are particularly noteworthy. First, the impact of the so-called 'primary' agents of political socialization, such as the family and social class, has declined. Whereas once people acquired, in late childhood and adolescence in particular, a framework of political sympathies and leanings that adult experience tended to modify or deepen, but seldom radically transformed, this has been weakened in modern society by greater social and geographical mobility, and by the spread of individualist and consumerist values. This, in turn, widens the scope for the media's political influence, as they are the principal mechanism through which information about issues and policies, and therefore political choices, is presented to the public. Second, the development of a mass television audience from the 1950s onwards, and more recently the proliferation of channels and media output associated with digital media, has massively increased the media's penetration of people's everyday lives. It has been estimated that by 2021 some 1.68 billion households worldwide will have access to television, while half the world's population had gained access to the internet by 2018. These trends, moreover, are most pronounced in the developing world, where, in the case of the internet, access doubled (to 42 per cent) between 2010 and 2017. This means that the public now relies on the media more heavily than ever before. Nevertheless, the relationship between the media and politics continues to be surrounded by debate and disagreement. These debates focus, not least, on the nature of the political biases that operate within the traditional or mass media (see p. 204), and the extent to which the way that political processes have come to be shaped or framed by the media has changed due to the shift in usage from traditional media to digital media, and especially social media.

Postmaterialism Postmaterialism is a theory that explains the nature of political concerns and values in terms of levels of economic development. It is loosely based on Abraham Maslow's (1908-70) 'hierarchy of needs', which places esteem and self-actualization above material or economic needs. Postmaterialism assumes that conditions of material scarcity breed egoistical and acquisitive values, meaning that politics is dominated by economic issues. However, in conditions of widespread prosperity, individuals
express more interest in 'postmaterial' or 'quality of life' issues, typically concerned with morality, political justice and personal fulfilment.

the media have become increasingly powerful political actors and, in some respects, more deeply enmeshed in the political process. At least two developments are particularly noteworthy. First, the impact of the so-called 'primary' agents of political socialization, such as the family and social class, has declined. Whereas once people acquired, in late childhood and adolescence in particular, a framework of political sympathies and leanings that adult experience tended to modify or deepen, but seldom radically transformed, this has been weakened in modern society by greater social and geographical mobility, and by the spread of individualist and consumerist values. This, in turn, widens the scope for the media's political influence, as they are the principal mechanism through which information about issues and policies, and therefore political choices, is presented to the public. Second, the development of a mass television audience from the 1950s onwards, and more recently the proliferation of channels and media output associated with digital media, has massively increased the media's penetration of people's everyday lives. It has been estimated that by 2021 some 1.68 billion households worldwide will have access to television, while half the world's population had gained access to the internet by 2018. These trends, moreover, are most pronounced in the developing world, where, in the case of the internet, access doubled (to 42 per cent) between 2010 and 2017. This means that the public now relies on the media more heavily than ever before. Nevertheless, the relationship between the media and politics continues to be surrounded by debate and disagreement. These debates focus, not least, on the nature of the political biases that operate within the traditional or mass media (see p. 204), and the extent to which the way that political processes have come to be shaped or framed by the media has changed due to the shift in usage from traditional media to digital media, and especially social media.

Postmaterialism Postmaterialism is a theory that explains the nature of political concerns and values in terms of levels of economic development. It is loosely based on Abraham Maslow's (1908-70) 'hierarchy of needs', which places esteem and self-actualization above material or economic needs. Postmaterialism assumes that conditions of material scarcity breed egoistical and acquisitive values, meaning that politics is dominated by economic issues. However, in conditions of widespread prosperity, individuals
express more interest in 'postmaterial' or 'quality of life' issues, typically concerned with morality, political justice and personal fulfilment.

In its early phase, the use of new information and communications technology for political purposes was widely seen as a progressive step, leading to an improvement in the quality of political life, particularly by transferring power from governments and political elites to the public at large. This was reflected in growing interest in the idea of 'e-democracy'. However, e-democracy (sometimes called 'digital democracy' or 'cyberdemocracy') is a vague and contested term which covers a diverse range of activities. Some of these are 'top-down' activities (initiated by government or other public bodies) while others are 'bottom-up' ones (initiated by citizens and activists), with a further distinction being made between those that involve a one-way flow of information from government to citizens and those involving a two-way process of interaction.

online voting (e-voting) in elections or referendums online petitions (e-petitions) organized by governments or other bodies accessing political information, news and comment via websites, blogs (basically, a personal website), and so on
the use of social networking sites or interactive television to allow citizens to engage in political argument and debate and, possibly, policy-making
the use of mobile and smartphones and social media to organize popular protests and demonstrations.

E-democracy: The use of computer-based technologies to deepen and enhance citizens' engagement in democratic processes.

Advocates of the use of social media in politics typically argue that the benefits of Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube and other platforms is that they offer citizens wider and easier access to information and political comment. The proliferation of websites developed, variously, by professional groups, businesses, lobbying bodies and think-tanks means that, for the first time, citizens and citizen groups are privy to a quantity and quality of information that may rival that of governments. This has generally empowered non-state actors at the expense of national governments and traditional political elites. Non-governmental organizations (see p. 273) and interest groups (see p. 272) have thus become more effective in challenging the positions and actions of government and, sometimes, even displaced government as an authoritative source of views and information about specialist subjects, ranging from the environment and global poverty to public health and civil liberties.

A further development has been the impact of social media on journalism. This has occurred in two ways. First, the rise of the blog has greatly expanded the contours of political commentary, as the growing 'blogosphere' allows writers, academics, politicians and others to share their observations and opinions about political matters with whoever may be interested in accessing them. Second, there has been a growth in user-generated content, stemming from the increased willingness of private citizens, sometimes (but not necessarily) in newsworthy or politically charged situations, to share their thoughts, experiences and, frequently, pictures with others via social media. This creates a network of exchanges involving a potentially unlimited number of people.

Social media have also been credited with having supported the development of new political and social movements and increasing their effectiveness. They have thus given rise to a new style of activist politics, sometimes called the 'new politics'. The key advantage of social media, from this perspective, is not just that they open up new opportunities for political participation, but also that these forms of participation are, by their nature, decentralized and non-hierarchical. For example, armed with mobile and smart phones, and through the development of online communities, anti-globalization or anti-capitalist protesters had been able to mount demonstrations and engage in agitation and direct action. This trend first became apparent during the so-called 'Battle of Seattle' in 1999, when some 50,000 activists, some communicating via mobile phones, forced the cancellation of the opening ceremony of a World Trade Organization meeting. The political potential of Facebook was demonstrated by its role in facilitating the spread of pro-democracy protests in the early phase of the 2011 Arab Spring (see p. 87). Online movements have also sprung up, aiming to give a political voice to individuals who may otherwise not be heard, with examples including Black Lives Matter (#BlackLivesMatter), which campaigns against violence and systemic racism towards black people, and Me Too (#MeToo), which campaigns against sexual harassment and assault.

Social media have also attracted criticism, however. They have, for instance, been linked to the trend towards e-democracy with the growth of a privatized and consumerist form of citizenship (in which entitlements are stressed to the detriment of responsibilities). How meaningful is democratic participation if it lacks a genuinely 'public' dimension and fails to engender meaningful debate and discussion? In this view, online political communities and forms of online political participation will never serve the cause of democracy as well as face-to-face human interaction alternatives. A further drawback of e-democracy is that it is based on the assumption that new information and communication technologies are, in themselves, progressive and liberating. In reality, technology is either liberating or oppressive depending on who is using it, and the uses to which it is put. It is worth remembering that the technologies that helped in the spreading and coordination of pro-democracy demonstrations during the Arab Spring are the same ones that, in other circumstances, have been used to spread racial or religious bigotry, or to promote political extremism generally.

One of the aspects of politics most clearly influenced by social media is digital campaigning. Indeed, some argue that
the advent of digital campaigning, or
E-campaigning: The use of computer-based technologies to publicize, organize, lobby and raise funds for the selection or election of candidates for political office. (e-campaigning, is bringing about a change as significant as the shift from door-to-door canvassing and local election meetings to what essentially became television-orientated campaigning.) Websites, emails and podcasts provide candidates and parties with a fast and cheap means of getting their message across to a (potentially) large audience, in the process, aiding in the recruitment of campaign volunteers and the raising of campaign funds. E-campaigning has the advantage that it is particularly effective in reaching younger people, who have often been the most difficult section of the population to engage through the use of conventional strategies. Furthermore, social media allow campaigns to customize their messages on the basis of selected demographics (age, educational achievement, region, and so forth), by giving them access to a wealth of personal information about the people who follow them. Finally, social media are structured to allow campaigns to 'go viral', through the use, for instance, of the 'Share' function on Facebook and the 're-tweet' function on Twitter.

Although the internet has been used in campaigning since the mid-1990s, particularly in the USA, it became particularly prominent during Barack Obama's US presidential campaigns in 2008 and 2012. Obama's team used forums and social media platforms to build relationships, particularly with supporters, and would-be supporters, aged 18-29, also encouraging the spread of wider networks of support via the website MyBarackObama.com. Sympathisers were also sent regular updates on Obama's policy positions by email and text messages. Nevertheless, new technologies were certainly not the be-all and end-all of the Obama campaigns, which also relied heavily, and spent most money, on traditional strategies such as television advertising and poster campaigns. However, Donald Trump's seemingly instinctive understanding of the power of digital media, and his use of social media during the 2016 US presidential campaign and since, has had a yet more significant impact on politics. By posting tweets on a daily basis, often expressing controversial views, and by re-tweeting posts with predominantly right-wing content, Trump has used Twitter not only to speak directly to voters (without any cost), but also to set the news agenda for the day ahead. Trump's tweets have thus, in effect, become news events in their own right

Although such developments are widely seen as a consequence of trends such as the rise of populism (see p. 53) and the resurgence of nationalism, the growing use of social media may also have contributed. For example, the growth of blogs and news websites has drawn new voices, and new types of voice, into the arena of political discourse. This applies, in particular, to people whose radical views and abrasive or 'straight-talking' political style probably makes them ill-suited to a career in conventional politics or journalism. Examples of such news websites include Beitbart, often seen as a key mouthpiece for the 'alt-right' (alternative right) in the USA, which has been closely aligned to Donald Trump, especially through the president's former chief strategist, Steve Bannon. In the UK, the left-wing media outlet, The Canary, was founded in 2015 with the purpose of supporting Jeremy Corbyn's attempts to carry through a comprehensive radicalization of the Labour Party. Other factors may also support this trend towards polarization. These include what may be a general tendency for views expressed online to be less civil and more politically 'raw' than views expressed in the context of face-to-face interaction. Similarly, provoking shock and even outrage may help to generate profit, by extending reach and so helping to boost advertising revenues. In other words, in the internet age, it may pay to be offensive.

Propaganda Propaganda is information (or disinformation) disseminated in a deliberate attempt to shape opinions and, possibly, stimulate political action. Propaganda is a pejorative term, implying both untruth or distortion, and a (usually crude) desire to manipulate and control public opinion. Propaganda differs from political bias in that it is systematic and deliberate, whereas the latter may be partial and unintentional. A distinction is sometimes drawn between 'black' propaganda (blatant lies), 'grey' propaganda (distortions and half truths) and 'white' propaganda (the truth).

This is because, as politics is inevitably concerned with the acquisition and exercise of power, it cannot but be entangled with manipulation, exaggeration, concealment and downright lies. This is particularly the case when government power is largely or entirely unchecked, and the media are controlled, directly or indirectly, by government and used as a propaganda machine. The classic example of a propaganda machine was that constructed under Joseph Goebbels in Nazi Germany. The Nazis set out to 'coordinate' German society through an elaborate process of ideological indoctrination. For example, youth organizations were set up in the form of the Youth and the League of German Maidens; the school curriculum was entirely revised and all teachers were coerced to join the Nazi Teachers' League; and the German Reliever Front replaced free trade unions, providing workers with recreational facilities through the 'Strength through Joy' organization. As chief propagandist of the Nazi Party, in 1933 Goebbels created a new department, the Reich Ministry of Information and Propaganda, which inundated Germany with an unending flood of propaganda and oversaw a programme of systematic censorship. Underlying these developments was the assumption that, as Goebbels put it, 'if you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it'. During the Nazi period, the theory of the 'big lie' was applied, not least, to the 'Final Solution', the planned extermination of European Jewry.

Constitutional and political checks on government power, including a free media and electoral democracy, undoubtedly modify the disposition within politics towards dishonesty and deceit, but by no means eradicate it altogether. Apart from anything else, the need to win elections means that, among politicians and political parties, the desire to accentuate the positive and conceal the negative is irresistible. Moreover, although liberal-democratic structures rule out 'official' propaganda and crude ideological manipulation, governments have come to shape the news agenda by new techniques for the control and dissemination of information, often described as 'news management', or 'spin'. The favourable presentation of information and policies has thus become a major preoccupation of governments across the globe. The art of 'spin', carried out by so-called 'spin-doctors', includes practices such as the control of sources of information to ensure that only an official 'line' is presented, the use of unattributable briefings or 'leaks', and the release of information close to media deadlines to prevent checking and the identification of counter-arguments. News management of this kind is most advanced in the USA, where it has become commonplace for electoral strategists and campaign managers to take up senior White House posts, if their candidate wins the presidency.
However, the 2016 US presidential election took news management in a more controversial and radical direction. The frequency with which often-sensational political news appeared despite having no basis in fact, and the tendency for stories deemed to be damaging to a particular candidate or cause to simply be dismissed as 'fake news', gave the impression that politics had entered a 'post-truth' era. Although the growth in 'fake news' is often linked to changes in the media, and notably the absorption of social media into everyday life (see p. 215), the advent of post-truth politics can be seen as essentially a consequence of the rise of populism and of the anti-intellectualism that it typically brings in its wake. This can be observed in the fact that its two clearest examples have been the election of Donald Trump in the USA and the Brexit referendum in the UK.

Censorship: A policy or act of control over what can be said, written, published or performed in order to suppress what is considered morally or politically unacceptable. Spin: The presentation of information so as to elicit the desired response, or being 'economical with the truth'.

Populist anti-intellectualism has taken at least three forms. First, as politicians including Donald Trump and Michael Gove, one of the leaders of the 'Leave' campaign in the Brexit referendum, have put it, people have 'had enough' of experts. Respect for experts requires a level of deference that is no longer easily found in modern societies. All too often, experts have come to be seen as members of a derided establishment, set apart from the mass of the population by the lives they lead, the language they speak and, indeed, by their very expertise. In that sense, their education is a source of corruption, imbuing them with a sense of self-regard and encouraging them to believe that they are somehow 'above' the mass of the population. Such a view clashes sharply with the conventional notion that expertise derives from a disinterested (and probably public-spirited) search for knowledge. Populists, by contrast, place their faith in the opinions of the many, not of the few. This is based both on the assumption that the (albeit untutored) instincts of the masses have a moral purity that does not apply in the case of the elite, and the belief that 'the crowd' has greater wisdom than either a small group or a single individual (Surowiecki, 2004). Second, as populism draws much of its potency from its ability to offer simple solutions to simple problems, it offers little scope for the complexities that are an inevitable feature of intellectual analysis. For example, during the 2016 US presidential election, Donald Trump repeatedly stated a commitment to solve the problem of immigration from Mexico by building a wall that Mexico would pay for. However, he did this without addressing 'difficult' (that is, complex) questions about, among other things, how and exactly where the wall would be constructed, how much the wall would cost, how Mexico could be persuaded to pay for it, and who would pay for the wall if Mexico refused to pay up. Politicians may, therefore, only be able to adopt bold, confident stances on matters that deeply trouble the electorate if they either choose not to think too deeply about the matter in hand, or choose not to share their deeper thinking about the matter in hand with the electorate. Third, populists are keenly aware that, in the age of anti-politics (see Chapter 20), sustained political engagement is often more likely to be achieved through feelings and emotions than it is through reason and analysis. This is because the disenchantment that builds up in sections of the electorate that feel ignored by conventional politicians and parties makes them less susceptible to balanced debate and argument and more susceptible to an appeal based on anger or hope. Populists seek to exploit this by forging an emotional connection with disaffected (potential) voters, and do so through the use of simple and affective slogans. Examples of this include 'Make America Great Again', from Trump's 2016 election campaign, and 'Taking Back Control', from the Brexit referendum campaign.